Asbestos Project Notification and Inspection Report, Dec 2002

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

WTC Impact on Water System 2

Water Supply Security On 9/11, upstate immediately established a command center operation. All staff were put on 12 hour shifts. Fixed posts were manned and air surveillance was deployed, both helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. Barriers were erected at all entrances. Fishing, boating and hiking was suspended. Additional “Jersey” barriers are being acquired to enhance longer-term barrier placement capability. Key elements of the system are being subjected to more extreme security measures. (?? Diana...Tom Hook mentioned this but didn’t describe the extreme measure. Perhaps we can’t describe them in detail for security ?? Do or Should we say more here ??)

Commissioner Miele has asked and the Secretary of the Army has agreed to provide DEP with special security on an emergency basis. This equipment consists of cameras, alarms, monitoring equipment and the like. A private citizen also made a gift to the Department of a number night goggles for use in nighttime observation around the watershed lands and facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers is engaged in reviewing our security measures and will provide their advice and recommendations. The Corps also has agreed to assist in the procurement and installation of additional electronic monitoring security equipment over the near term to enhance the level of protection.

Water Supply has increased the level of sampling. It is noted, however, that sampling programs for the types of organisms and chemicals that are likely threats are not far advanced. The sheer size and design of the City’s water system, however, provides a formidable challenge to any possible threats of this type. Given the great quantity of water the system delivers on a daily basis, the introduction of a small amount of any particular agent would be quickly diluted and its effects, accordingly, diminished to the point where it would not pose a large scale risk. Effectively, large quantities of a poison agent, probably amounting to truckloads of material, would need to be introduced into the system to pose a significant general risk to the City’s population. Moreover, the scattered points of introduction also provide multiple barriers of protection. For instance, if a biological agent were introduced in an upland reservoir, it would have to withstand an extended period of cold temperatures in the waters long travel time to the City and it would be subject to chlorination and disinfection at several points before it entered the City tunnels. Thus, the system’s scale and design presents a significant obstacle to a potential terrorist type threat to the water system which could affect a substantial population. It is believed that the more serious threat of water supply contamination lies on the smaller scale, in the introduction of an agent into the internal plumbing of a large building, causing deaths within that building and starting a “panic” in the streets relative to Citywide water supply contamination.

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