NYC-WTC_000233682

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

response guidelines

Notifications within utility. • Drinking water primacy agency. • Emergency response agencies.

1 Local law enforcement agencies. • State/local public health agency. • FBI. • National Response Center. • Other state and federal o assistance providers. t ii 1 ii w Bl III i Bl Bl Isolate affected area. • Implement appropriate public • Characterize affected area. Initiate site characterization. health protection measures. • Revise public health protection Estimate spread of suspected • Plan for alternate water supply. lueasures as necessary. contaminant. • Analyze samples. • Provide alternate water supply. s Consult external information • Perform site characterization at • Plan remediation activities. P sources. additional investigation sites. Bl Bl H

Security breaches may be the most common type of threat warning encountered by a utility since they may result from trespassing, vandalism, theft, or failure to re-secure facilities following legitimate activities. The purpose of the threat evaluation under this scenario is to distinguish between these more frequent, yet relatively harmless security breaches, and those few that might be considered ‘credible’ contamination threats.

At the ‘possible’ stage of the threat evaluation, information about the security breach will be available. Specifically, the location of the security breach will be known, which will likely be established as the initial investigation site. Other information may be available from alarms (including surveillance footage), which may help to establish the time of the security breach. The evaluation at this stage should consider whether or not there was an opportunity for contamination at the site of the security breach. Furthermore, “normal” activity should be considered and investigated at this stage as a potential cause of the security breach (e.g., was a utility crew recently at the site and potentially forgot to re-secure the area?). Potential response actions to a ‘possible’ threat may include isolating areas of the system that could be affected, initiating site characterization activities to collect more information in support of the threat evaluation, and initiating the process to estimate the spread of the suspect water through the system.

Information that may be available at the ‘credible’ stage includes the results of site characterization, an assessment of previous security incidents, real-time water quality data in the area of the security breach, and an assessment of the threat by law enforcement. The evaluation at this stage will consider whether or not signs of contamination were discovered during site characterization, including unusual results from field testing or unusual observations during the

68 Interim Final - August 2004

CITY_21MC100_004992407

NYC-WTC_000233750