World Trade Center environmental data report, 2001-2002

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

Some agree. “It was clear that at the local level New York officials weren’t ready to respond to something of this complexity,” says Alison Geyh, of John Hopkins.

Other experts would later write that much of the attention would be focused on vast physical hazards and challenges posed by cleaning up “the pile” rather than the complex, imprecedented range of environmental hazards facing rescuers, emergency responders and residents in the surrounding commimity.

“Initial sampling at Ground Zero was hampered by the general chaos and uncertainty, the ongoing fire, and by treatment of Ground Zero as a crime scene by federal agencies,” writes Lioy. And air sampling, for example, to check for contaminants was substantially delayed, by about a week. Photo; Earl Dotter “Considering the total surprise and resulting chaos, the response by various organizations was reasonable. However, it is also apparent that no agency was prepared to deal with the devastation of this magnitude in a major urban area,” he adds.

“At Ground Zero, they discounted the environmental hazards, even though this was no ordinary building collapse,” says Westchester County’s Anthony Sutton. “As the operation wore on, and time was no longer a factor, people could have stepped back and made it a priority. Before they sent in workers for a protracted amount of time, they should have very early on, established baseline pulmonary fiinction tests on workers to detect any obstructions to their lungs.”

Months later, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, the Congressman representing "Ground Zero" and the surrounding areas, argued that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should have taken the lead role. EPA, he charged, “has failed in its mission to "protect human health and to safeguard the natural environment..." by not exercising its fiill authority to test and clean all indoor spaces where people live and work. As such, the EPA has created a fiill-scale crisis of public confidence.”

His contention was that there was a huge gap in the agencies’ assessments due to potentially adverse health effects from indoor air pollution caused by very fine particulates seeping through fabrics and tiny building crevices.

Even though many of EPA Regions responded within the first few days, EPA’s Region II office turned some away, including Region 8, which had particular expertise in asbestos.

He argued that the EPA had the clear authority to respond to the release of hazardous substances that may present an imminent and substantial danger to public health under the “National Contingency Plan,” authorized by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.

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