World Trade Center environmental data report, 2001-2002

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

Plus, this disaster zone called for extraordinary endurance. Firefighters who wear their standard gear are typically in and out of a fire scene within minutes, in contrast to this scenario, which would last months upon months. “Firefighters, with their self-contained breathing apparatus - (SCBA, nicknamed SCUBA) typically get a half-hour bottle of air, and they’re out long before that,” adds Lippy. “When they switched to the half-face respirator, they hadn’t been properly trained in it.”

Secondly, the respirators were difficult to wear while working. “A lot of workers didn’t wear the respirators,” says Lippy, “because it was very hard to talk in them.” In a dangerous environment, hearing and talking can be a necessity. Also, many of the cartridges that came with the respirators didn’t work well because they weren’t compatible, or they didn’t last long enough to be effective.

I LI Workers at the site needed to be properly M fi^tested, and trained—yet they weren’t for months. Lippy charges. While workers labored around the clock, they [ 1 got little if any protection. As an i, '■ example of how little attention went to IL * a health and safety, Lippy notes: “The first I. personal samples weren’t given until September 19 (a week after the attacks); fit tests weren’t required until October 17*; a safety plan wasn’t issued until October 29; and first formal training wasn’t given until November 29*. ... ./ B Photo: EPA

Had this been a typical workplace regulated by OSHA, there would have been standards requiring that all respirator users be properly trained, fit-tested, and medically certified for wearing such devices. But OSHA was serving only in a “consulting” role rather than an enforcement role, because the Fire Department, and later the Department of Design and Construction had command over the site—so such standards didn’t apply as they should have.

Lastly, says Lippy, one of the tragedies of the September 11* attack at the World Trade Center was the loss of New York’s “crack HAZMAT team.” The New York Fire Departments Hazardous Material (HAZ-MAT) companies suffered about 75 percent casualties—and their loss struck a blow for health and safety.

“With their loss, we lost that expertise, and we lost the ‘haz-mat’ culture,” says Lippy. “Had they been at the table, there would have been a different dynamic at work, valuing health and safety.”

Lippy and others felt that OSHA’s hazardous waste standards ought to have been brought to bear. But, he says, there were disagreements among the agencies about the necessity of protection against organic vapors and acid gases because the levels measured have been generally low.

“The position of the lUOE team is that the potential exposure to dioxin in the smoke warrants organic vapor protection. Additionally, the cartridges will protect against odors from bodies. The presence of large quantities of Freon means that hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acid can be

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