Law Department notice on WTC document preservation, Oct 2001

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

Page 9 Mr. Rick Seussc August 4,2003

observed n«ny who did wear ns^irators diKgently. There are hundreds of photographs that dqjict (he use of respiratory equipment and hard hats. Rc^irator use was tracked and atforeed throughout the ro^ronse Io the disaster, tn addition, this was not a hazardous waste operation. OSHA defines the scope of a “Isiraidous waste qpcraiion” as “clean up c^raations roquired by a geveratuadai body, wlxther fcdcral, state, local or other, involAnng hazardous substances that are conducted id uncunCrutlcd hazardous waste sites.” AlAougb the debris produced by the ccHapse of the WTC did contain minor concentrations of various contaminants, including arijestoa, fiberglass mid alkaline cement dust, extensive sampling never indicated the presence of hazardous waste as defined by the EPA in Resource Conservation and Recovery Acl regulations 40 CFR Parts 260-280. In addition, there was an aggressive safety and iwtdih effort underway, spearheaded by the PDC and OSHA working in close colisfxHation. Beginning .'jeptemher 12,2001, daily health and safety meetings were held and attended by multiple City, State and Fethaal agencies, including EPA, FEMA, OSHA. DEC, DDC, DOH, DEP. FDNY, NYPD and OEM, together with the contraclors’ safety petsonirel, al which air tnoniloring and PPE protocols were discussed and established. There was a preiitninaiy “Acctdeni Prevention Platt” in place from Scptcniber 14,2001 through October29,2001, at whxdt time die World Trade Center Emergcmcy T-nvtronment, Safety and Mtallh Plan” went into efieet. Teams of safety and heal^ professianals wedted around the clock providing “direct intervention” to get workers to coaiply with basic safety and healdi roquircmCjits, espociatly the use of PPE. There were as many as 30 siifety profes-siotiab on site e»:h day. OSHA employees were constantly roving the site wifi) safety cqutpineirl, and provided iiands-on instruction and preliminary fit ebetkiag at IS 89 and at supply caches twi ifac site. There are tens ofthousand of documents which record these multi-agency health and safety efforts, many of which have already been provided to the EPA. Additional documents can be provided upon request. 23. On page J 8, the first sentence be^naiag with “fa contrast” should read as follows: “fa contrast to the recovery «>peration at the WTC site, the January 2002 report noted that workers conducting WTC debris stating and inspection at the Frosh Kills landfill wore half-face re^jirators, hard hats, eye protection, and Tyvek suite.” The language that the work at Fresh Kifte was handled as a 'Tiazsudaus waste opcratimt” should be eliminated because WTC debris at the Fresh Kills landfill, and at Ground Zao, did not call for a hazardous waste response under OSHA or EPA standards, nor was it handled as such. The next sentence should beyin; “The author opined” (o avoid an erroneous impression foat the reported inforntation was an EPA finding. The sentence bcgiiuiing “fa other words” is inaccurate and should be rcpkicod with: “The author’s perception was that PPE use was more prevalent at the Fresh Kills landfill than at foe WTC site.” The report as writton is again misleading in describing the debris as hazardous waste, and mischaractcrizes the Fresh Killa landfill operation, which presented ite own unique, multi-facctcd challenges, as “less hazardous.”

24. On pugc 19 th© fita sentence of (he first full paragraph beginning “As the rescue phase progressed,” should be changed to read as follows: “As the rescue phase

147 Report No. 2003-P-00012

NYC-WTC_000145678