Law Department notice on WTC document preservation, Oct 2001

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document operations, in the midst of high security concems, and surrounded by construction equipment moving debris. The New York City Emergency Command Centor was destroyed, sgencics” New York offices were closed, communications services in Lower Manhattan were inoperative, and sirlines vere shut down. Given the magnitude of the disaster, the massiveneas of the response, the very real security tesues uf stake, and the many enfitics involved, it was canential thatthe Executive Branch coordinate the federal responas. Ata time of national emergency, the people expect the ee Appendix R government to speck with one voice. Note 3 Indeed, onc of the Jory lessons leamed is the need for centralized communications during times of national crisis. ‘The creation of the Department of Homeiand Security iostimtionalized the coordination of communications in one Department. The Draft Report, however, goes to preat length te erroneously criticize federal efforts, specifically the Council on Eavircamental Quality (CEQ), to coondinsfe health and safety communications. EPA, along with other agencies and departments responsible for environment, health and safety, acted ta provide the best health and safety guidance to those who lived and worked mm Lower Manhattan, based ov aveilable data and using our best professional judgement under Appendix R extraondinary circumstances. We continuously monitored the envirormnental effects ofthe [Note 4 explosion, fire and ultimate collapse of the WTC buildings. We made this data available as widely and as transparently as possible. Our public statements at every stage conveyed our best professional advice based on the most current data available, We contimie to evaluate our ssponse to identify improvements that can be made in how we manage and respond to future situations of this magnitude. A few weeks after the attacks, BPA commissioned a formal report, conducted by an objective outside contractor, to assess the “lessons teamed” from these events. Many of the “lessons leamed” thet we have been See Appendix R implementing since 2002, anticipated most of those the Draft Report now highlights. We are [Note § making every effort to strengthen our plaaning and response systems to be as ready as passibie Fer ny adressen catastrophic event, aad we aro commitied to continuing to provide the pulztic with the dest possible environmental information and sssistasce in dimes of national crises. The Report lacks sufficient acknowledgment of our efforts to implement our “lessons fearned,"and is flawed in its lack of recognition in other arcas such as: » EPA's message was communicated to different audiences. * For the “gecral publ,” EPA sa om he hogiosng tet peopl Wing one Ppendix R and working in tower Manhattan were nol exposed to levels of cortaninants m the outdoor air that EBA believed would pose a significant Jong-tenn lseadth threat. * EPA advised people experiencing acute healh problems to sae their sapere ay ror ig “PGS SORA 118 Report No. 2003-P-00012 NYC-WTC_000145649