Law Department notice on WTC document preservation, Oct 2001

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document operations, in the midst of high security concemss, and surrounded by constraction equipment moving debris. The New York City Emergency Command Center was destroyed, agencics” New York offices were closed, communications services in Lower Manhattan were inoperative, and airlines were shut down. Given the magnitude of the disaster, the massiveness of the response, the very real secusity temes af steko, and the many entities involved, it was essential that the Executive Branch coordinate the federal response. At a time of national emergency, the pcopie expcat a = [See Appendix R | government to speak with one voice. Note 3 Indeed, onc of the lozy lessons learned is the neod for centralized communications during times of national crisis ‘The creation of the Department of Homeland Security institutionalized the coordination of communications in one Department, The Draft Report, however, gots fo great lencth te erroncously oiticize federal efforts, specifically the Council an Environmental Quatity (CEQ), to coondinafe health and safety communicationa. EPA, along with other agencies and departments responsibte for environment, health and safety, acted ta provide the best health and safety guidance te those who lived and worked in Lower Manhattan, based ov available data and using our best professional judgement under Appendix R extraontinary circumstances. We continuously monitored the environmental effects afthe Note 4 explosion, fire and ultimate collapse of the WTC buildings. We made this data available as widely and as transparently as possible. Our public statements at every stege conveyed our best professional advice based on the most current data aveilabie. We continue to evaluate our sespansc te identify improvements that can be made in how we Tansge and respond to future situations of this magnitude. A few weeks after the attacks, BPA commissioned a formal report, conducted by att objective outside contractor, to assesa the “lessons leamed” from these events. Many of the “lessons leaned” that we have been See Appendix R implementing since 2002, anticipated most of those the Draft Report now highfights. Weare [Note 5 making every effort to strengthen our planning and response systems to be as ready us possible for any unforeseen cutastrophic event, and we are commitied to continuing to provide the puttic with the best possible environmental information and assistance in times of national crises. The Report lacks sufficient acknowledgment of our efforts to implement our “lessons teamed,” and is flawed in its lack of recognition in other arcas suth as: » EPA's message was communicated to different audiences. « For the “'gancral public,” EPA sued ftom the beginning thet people living rns ppendis R and working in lower Manhattan were not exposed to levels of contaminants in the outdoor air that EPA believed would pose a significant Jone-tenm ealth thraat. * EPA advised poopie experiencing acute health problems to see their Mae Protective eat eee pe a ae ae 118 Report No. 2003-P-00012 NYC-WTC_000145473