Law Department notice on WTC document preservation, Oct 2001

NYC 9/11 Public Portal Document

gPA*a Weaixwsc to ihe WmrM Tmtfg C«»twr CoPwasc;

Pwtft Report OtaiCT of die Immwttor Geaerat

GENERAL OBSERVA Respotise to the World Trade Carter collapse was unprecedeated in foe cballengea it presented to fodoat state and local emergency tespondets. EP A undertook tmmedjattt efforts to ascertain foe pcsenee of contaminants from the collapse and fires, and to ateiat FEMA and New York City in all phases of foe subsequent recovery and elemaqi. EPA’a activities icctuded sampling and ansdy^ of ambient a» and water, wash down and decontamioatjan of vehicles; isTO/^p^ndlxR removal and disposal ofbaztedous materials; veeimnung of dust and debris from streets; Note 10 supplying personal protective equipment; assisting Financial District in retrieval rtf eketronic Fles^pezs; and provision of data and health inforwiation to the poUtc. To illustrate foe tn^^oitodo of foe activities conducted at foe site, over 25,000 samples were taken rcprcsofrtit^ 227,000 measuromeRU of 692 potential coaUntinants. 7^ tnttial response enntinoed until May 2002 and at times, involved as Riany as 290 EPA and VS Coast Guard personitei, and 200 Agency cootsractors

White the rqwn aekcowlcdgos the ueqKeeedented nature ofthe response to the terrorist attack upon ibe WTC, many of its findwigs and recommendaxuma iropty that the rasponas could have been conducted tn a manner consistettt with a standard re^ulatoiy approach, jSee A|:q>enidix R iurapletnctrtatjon ofNBSKAPa asbestos regulaBtions. Ftodtear, the report does not recognize dud Note 11 the WTC response and dean up efforts were eondueted tn the absence of adequate backgrttund Qoucentrarions for the eontaarinajits of potential concem, e g ., tyjncal levels ofariieaaos or dioxin in an urban apartment Having such iafo«natiotJ svaifaWe would have gieady ^ipltfied Ac cflTon to didtneate areas that were impacted and datermise when indoor residential environments were clamed to pre-cveat conditioR. Additionally, the report does not adatowledgc the Agency's massive campaign to provide quality infonnstion to the poUic - through hundreds of media interviews, tens of thousasads of fact sheets and handouts and imtovative use of the internet, including information in three tettgua^gee. Lasdy, and most unportanily Ac report feils to rocognize the nature ofdecision atafeing in a catastropliic emergency. We must accept that a fnore incident nwy urvoK<c a scenario ae contaminant Aar we simply cannot foresee. Thu means that vAiie work can nod should be done to develop protocols, standards and batebroaiks - when an event of foe magnitude of the World Trade Cotter attack occurs, many decisions wiU based on the best professioial jtadgcmcat oferaergeacy responders friwo all Inanches and levels of government, through the leadership renks ofthe Department erf" Homeland Seeing.

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120 Report No. 2003-P-00012

NYC-WTC_000145651